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‘‘Organisms are not billiard balls, pro-
pelled by simple and measurable external
forces to predictable new positions on life’s
pool table. Sufficiently complex systems
have greater richness. Organisms have a
history that constrains their future in
myriad, subtle ways.’’—Stephen Jay
Gould (1980: 16) [1]
What is the relationship between exter-
nal—physical and biological—influences
on increasingly complex matter over
billions of years? In his most recent book,
Islands in the Cosmos: the Evolution of Life on
Land, Dale Russell attempts to answer this
question. Russell is the senior curator of
paleontology at the North Carolina Mu-
seum of Natural Sciences and, among
other things, is well known for proposing
in 1971 an extraterrestrial cause for the
Cretaceous-Tertiary extinction that wiped
out the non-avian dinosaurs [2]. This
places Russell among the first paleontolo-
gists to consider this extinction as a
relatively sudden event in Earth’s history.
Dale Russell has spent his lifetime pon-
dering grand evolutionary questions, and
it is a quest that Islands in the Cosmos well
illustrates.
His central thesis explains that evolu-
tionary theory (as he views it)—based on
‘‘random mutations’’ and ‘‘adaptation to
irregular changes in the physical environ-
ment’’—inadequately accounts for long-
term trends in the competitive abilities of
organisms and the ultimate appearance of
sentient beings (e.g., Homo sapiens) in the
cosmos. Russell instead proposes that even
though mutations are random, because
‘‘…the effects of natural selection are not
random, and modulated by adaptive
responses to irregular changes in the
physical environment,’’ properties of mat-
ter and feedback in biotic competition
have established a deterministic trajectory
in the history of life. His argument distills
to the following interrelated points:
N The universe is fine-tuned for life as we
know it.
N The physical workings of the Earth
(e.g., its radius and tilt, mantle con-
vection, the heterogeneity of continen-
tal surfaces, and a long-term stable
environment) favor the origin of life
and evolution of multicellular terres-
trial beings.
N Positive feedback and competitive
interactions among organisms in-
crease evolutionary rates, competitive
abilities, activity levels, and behavior-
al complexity of these beings over
time.
N Convergent evolution is a testament to
these precepts, and sentient beings are
a natural and emergent outcome of
these processes.
Although he broadly frames these issues
in the introductory pages and synthesizes
them in the final chapter, Russell dedicates
the bulk of this self-proclaimed essay to a
chronology of evolution in the broad sense,
as ‘‘change through time’’. In 289 pages
(82% of the book), Russell retells the
13.7 Ga (billion year) history of our cosmos
and the ,3.8–3.5 Ga history of life on
Earth. He provides occasional ‘‘hints’’ of
his thesis in the larger chapter text and
briefly elaborates on them in the final
paragraphs of each chapter, but for the
most part, his main ideas seem to get lost in
the bombardment of historical and paleo-
ecological facts through time. His love of
dinosaurs and of the Cretaceous Period
certainly shines through the wash of
information. For example, when framing
the seven most important scientific debates
over the last 50 years, three of the seven
questions include controversy over dino-
saurian evolution. Unfortunately, however,
in an attempt to pull information from such
a broad range of disciplines, there are
several mistakes and irregularities that the
specialist might find distracting. For exam-
ple, instead of explaining that structures
and sequences (as opposed to whole
organisms) are recapitulated during ontog-
eny [3], Russell incorrectly argues that we
replay ‘‘the previous evolutionary history
[of our] ancestors’’ (pg. 120).
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Earth, and life through time might
otherwise interest the triviaphile, but it
is difficult to know his intended audience.
Specialized terms are often used without
explanation (e.g., Opiliones, an obscure
group of arachnids), and basic concepts
are commonly followed with reasonable
elaboration (e.g., natural selection). Irre-
spective of his intent to commit much of
his essay to the historical record (i.e., so
that if rejected, his thesis ‘‘…will not
detract from an appreciation of the
history of terrestrial life on our planet…’’
[pg. 319]), his ideas nonetheless touch
upon several important evolutionary
questions.
Russell’s central question is whether
evolution is ‘‘random (contingent) or
directional (teleological)’’ (pg. 7). Although
he passionately argues for ultimate direc-
tion (i.e., determinism) and promotes the
view of being ‘‘inevitably human in a
lonely universe’’ [4], he never fully ex-
plains what contingency means (it is simply
when preexisting events determine the
nature of succeeding ones), or relates his
thesis to essential evolutionary notions that
naturally emerge from these ‘‘ultimate’’
evolutionary questions. Thus, to under-
stand his thesis more fully, it is necessary
to explain a few additional evolutionary
details.
Russell’smajor biological preceptsderive
from themodernsynthesis—theintellectual
fusion of Darwin’s concept of natural
selection with Mendel’s ‘‘heritable factors,’’
or genes [5]—and he clearly subscribes to
the view that variation is copious and non-
directional, that natural selection as an
external driver acts at the level of organisms
to impose direction, that organismal com-
petition promotes divergence (like Darwin’s
‘‘principle of divergence’’ [6]), and that the
full panoply of life’s diversity arises when
these tenets are extended (i.e., extrapolated)
over geologic time [5]. Although his
addition to these precepts includes the
argument that physical and biological
influences impose ultimate direction on
life’s trajectory, his thesis is fundamentally
founded in the dogma of the modern
synthesis. Thus, by ignoring and/or reject-
ing the historiographic account of evolu-
tionary ideas over the last 150 years [7],
Russell has come to argue that macroevo-
lutionary direction derives from the role of
external influences and extrapolationist
thinking. In other words, in his view,
external factors impose a deterministic
outcome on the history of life.
In following, Russell’s argument for the
overarching roles of the ‘‘external’’ and of
the ‘‘deterministic’’ quickly break down
when the subsequent evolutionary data,
which he does not reflect upon, are
considered: (a) internal processes like
development and genealogical history
constrain (or channel, as a positive defini-
tion) variation and evolutionary direction
over time [7–10], (b) the intersection of
this ‘‘channeled’’ variation is random
relative to the specific environment a
lineage inhabits over geologic time [11],
and (c) there are certain characteristics
that individual organisms cannot pos-
sess—like the tendency to vary or a
geographic range—and which instead
characterize lineages. This emerges over
macroevolutionary time in processes like
sorting and clade selection, whereby
natural selection acts on lineages to
produce trends that do not merely result
from competitive interactions among indi-
viduals [12–17].
These data unavoidably compromise
Russell’s thesis, as the argument now shifts
to the role of internal and emergent (i.e.,
non-extrapolationist) processes laying their
contingent fingerprints on life’s trajectory.
However, there is no need to create false
dichotomies. There appears good evidence
that variation is channeled by internal and
external sources [18,19], that evolution is
hierarchical and selection acts at multiple
levels, and that some—but certainly not
all—microevolutionary processes extrapo-
late over geological time [20]. Further-
more, whereas ecological determinism
(determinism in the small sense, over short
time scales) may set limits on the range of
feasible adaptations to a particular envi-
ronment [21], contingency unavoidably
acts at every biological tier and thus
naturally imparts direction from chance
interactions over all facets of evolutionary
time.
Islands in the Cosmos is another attempt in
recent literature [4,22] to hypothesize
determinism as an ultimate outcome in
the evolution of life. However, contrary to
the dichotomy Russell proposes, this view
should not be seen as an alternative to
contingency. Although famous authors
(e.g., GeeratVermeij) and great papers
[23] may draw upon evidence of conver-
gent and parallel evolution to argue for
ecological determinism, these arguments
are not at odds with the role of contin-
gency—whether in exploitation and op-
portunism, or as a major player in the
assemblage of biochemical pathways, mor-
phological features, or diversity patterns—
over evolutionary time.
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